Ohio R.C. 2744 gives political subdivisions immunity from motor vehicle liability for damages caused by police officers, firefighters, and EMTs while in the course of an “emergency call.” R.C. 2744.01(A) defines an emergency call, in relevant part, as “a call to duty, including. . . police dispatches . . . that demand an immediate response” on the part of a public safety employee. Specifically, R.C. 2744(B)(1)(a)-(c) provides a full defense to motor vehicle liability where: (1) the vehicle operator was a member of the municipality’s police department, fire department, or emergency medical service; (2) the safety officer was responding to an emergency call; and (3) the safety officer did not operate the vehicle in a willful and wanton manner. Recent rulings by the Ohio Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Appellate District (Cuyahoga County) highlight the breadth of immunity that R.C. 2744 affords political subdivisions whose safety/emergency personnel are involved in motor vehicle accidents while performing an emergency call.
In Smith v. McBride, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4674, Sergeant Travis Carpenter (“Carpenter”) of the Clinton Township Police Department, collided with the Plaintiff’s car outside his department’s jurisdiction while responding to a general dispatch call for assistance from a Franklin County Sheriff’s deputy chasing a suspect on foot. When the call for assistance came in, Carpenter was two miles away. However, there was no mutual aid agreement between Clinton Township and Franklin County. At the time of the collision, Carpenter was driving at least 15 miles above the speed limit and without his sirens and lights activated.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Carpenter and Clinton Township, concluding that since Carpenter had a professional obligation to respond to the dispatch, he was on an emergency call for purposes of R.C. 2744.01(A) and 2744.02(B)(1)(a), notwithstanding the lack of a mutual aid agreement. Moreover, the trial court determined that Carpenter had not engaged in willful, wanton or reckless conduct. A divided appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the issue was whether Carpenter was actually on an emergency call given the absence of a mutual- aid agreement that required Carpenter to respond outside his jurisdiction. The Court noted that nothing within R.C. 2744 indicates that immunity for an emergency call depends on the existence of a mutual-aid agreement. To the contrary, the terms of the statute encompass every emergency call. Therefore, the Court, citing the statute’s plain language, ruled that the absence of a mutual-aid agreement between two jurisdictions, by itself, is not determinative of whether a police officer who leaves his jurisdiction is on an emergency call for purposes of immunity. Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment.
In Stevenson v. Prettyman, 193 Ohio App. 3d 234; 2011-Ohio-718, the plaintiff sustained injuries when her car was struck at an intersection by the patrol car driven by Cleveland Police Officer Roger Prettyman. At the time of the accident, Prettyman was transporting a prisoner to the hospital for medical treatment. He did not have his lights and siren activated. Plaintiff claimed that Stevenson had proceeded into the intersection without having stopped at the red flashing light.
The City and Prettyman moved for summary judgment claiming immunity under R.C. 2744. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that issues of fact existed as to whether Prettyman had operated his patrol car in a wanton and reckless manner, thereby precluding immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a).
As an initial matter, the Appeals Court determined that Prettyman, by transporting a prisoner to the hospital, was responding to a “call to duty” and, therefore, was on an “emergency call” for purposes of immunity. Next, the court observed that although Prettyman did not activate his lights and siren, it was not dispositive of whether immunity applied. In fact, the Court noted that even if Prettyman had activated his lights and sirens, his actions – “depending on the circumstances” – may still be wanton and reckless if the evidence revealed that he failed “to exercise any care whatsoever” towards the Plaintiff. Ultimately, the court concluded that when viewed under the “totality of the circumstances,” even if Prettyman did not have his lights and siren activated and he proceeded into the intersection against a red flashing light without stopping, he did so “cautiously.” In this regard, the Court was persuaded by Prettyman’s testimony by affidavit that he had carefully entered the intersection, a fact Plaintiff failed to counter.
Smith and Prettyman illustrate the deference that Ohio courts give to political subdivisions whose safety/emergency personnel are accused of motor vehicle negligence while performing an emergency call. A safety officer engaged in an emergency call who causes injury to a third party is immune from liability under R.C. 2744 so long as there is no evidence of willful, wanton, or reckless conduct by the officer. Moreover, immunity will apply even when the officer is responding to an emergency call within a foreign jurisdiction that does not have a mutual aid agreement with the responding officer’s home jurisdiction.
Should you desire a full text of Smith v. McBride and/or Stevenson v. Prettyman, or have any questions regarding these issues, please contact one of our Governmental/Public Entity Liability Group Members.
