The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) has been a mainstay topic of employment law since Congress enacted the law in 1990. However, Congress’s amendment of the Act in 2008 has caused concern for many employers as to how to interpret the new provisions and what rules or policies to institute in the workplace to ensure compliance with federal law. Specifically, employers and courts alike have struggled over the ADA’s newly broadened definition of “disability” and how to work with employees that claim these disabilities. In addition, the stated purpose of the 2008 amendments to the Act is to take the focus away from whether an employee is defined as “disabled”, and instead focus on accommodating employees with disabilities and health issues. In short, the scope of employees who may now claim protection under the Act has significantly increased. This brief report will examine two recent U.S. Court of Appeals cases (4th and 10th Circuits) that provide additional insight for employers regarding what health conditions qualify for protection under the Act as an “actual disability.”
By way of brief background, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against qualifying individuals on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In particular, an employee is considered “wrongfully discharged” under the Act when the employee can show that he or she was terminated because of a disability. Congress amended the ADA in 2008 in response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), in which the Court denied a claimant’s ADA charge because her condition failed to qualify as a “disability” as the term was then strictly interpreted. The Toyota Manufacturing plaintiff suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, which inhibited her from performing manual tasks required by her job. In that case, the US Supreme Court strictly interpreted the ADA’s phrase “substantially limits an individual from performing a major life activity” to require a plaintiff to show that he or she has “an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives” and that the impairment is permanent or long-term. In other words, the Court determined that the employee’s impairment in Toyota Manufacturing did not qualify under the ADA as a “disability” because the manual tasks she was unable to perform were not of sufficiently central importance to most people’s daily lives.
When Congress amended the ADA, overturning Toyota Manufacturing, it stated that it was Congress’ purpose to focus the inquiry under the Act on whether entities covered by the ADA had complied with their obligations. The ADA amendments informed the courts that they were not to engage in an extensive analysis of whether the person’s impairment met a strict definition or elevated standard in order to qualify as a “disability.” Thus, the amended ADA now provides protection for an expansive range of conditions, as the term “disability” is to be “construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted by [its] terms.”
Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp. – 4th Circuit
In Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp., 740 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit considered the case of a senior analyst for a government contractor who claimed he was wrongfully discharged as a result of his disability. Summers, the claimant, had been injured while traveling for work when he stepped off a commuter train, tripped, and struck his knees against the train platform. His injuries to both legs were fairly substantial and, following two surgeries, doctors informed Summers it would likely be seven months before he could walk again. Summers informed Altarum of the incident and requested a graduated return to work, including a period of time off under short-term disability followed by working from home until he could walk again. Altarum’s insurer approved the short-term disability benefits, but the employer never addressed Summers’ proposal for the graduated return. Instead, Altarum later terminated Summers’ employment in order to replace him with another analyst. Summers then brought his claim for wrongful discharge under the ADA in the Eastern District of Virginia.
At Summers’ initial trial, the district court held that he had failed to allege he was disabled under the ADA. In its view, the court determined that a “temporary condition, even up to a year, does not fall within the purview of the [ADA].” Thus, because Summers was expected to regain his ability to walk after the seven-month period, the injury failed to qualify as a “disability”. Additionally, the district court determined that Summers could have worked with wheelchair assistance during the period and therefore could not be considered disabled. However, on appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed stating that “the duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant in determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” Furthermore, the court stated that even impairments that last for only a short period of time may be covered if they are sufficiently severe. In Summers’ case, the Court found that his inability to walk for seven months was sufficiently severe to qualify under the Act for protection as an “actual disability.” Lastly, the court held that whether Summers could have performed his job with the assistance of a wheel chair during the recovery period was immaterial for determining whether his condition qualified as an “actual disability”.
Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc. – 10th Circuit
The Tenth Circuit also considered the parameters of an “actual disability” under the ADA in Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d 530 (10th Cir. 2014). In Smothers, a surface maintenance mechanic alleged wrongful termination on account of his disability against his employer when he was fired for violating the company’s safety policy. Smothers had injured his neck and developed degenerative disc disease in his spine in 1994, resulting in substantial difficulty sleeping and necessitating frequent time off for pain treatments. The company granted Smothers’ requests for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), but managers and supervisors frequently complained about the amount of time Smothers took off for leave. One day a hydrochloric acid leak was discovered in the Solvay’s plant and Smothers was assigned to assist in the repair of the pump connected to that line. When Smothers discovered the cause of the leak, he removed the offending part from the pump in a manner inconsistent with company safety policy and was chastised by a co-worker. Both Smothers and the co-worker engaged in a loud, verbal disagreement that was witnessed by other Solvay employees. The co-worker eventually reported the incident to his supervisors, including his observation that Smothers had failed to follow safety protocol. After interviewing only the co-worker, management decided to terminate Smothers, refusing to allow Smothers the opportunity to give his version of the events.
In Smothers’ case before the federal district court of Wyoming, the court held that the plaintiff failed to allege a compensable claim under the ADA because he was not “disabled” within the meaning of the statute and had failed to demonstrate a pretextual discharge. However, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Smothers’ condition qualified under the ADA as an “actual disability” because his inability to sleep and perform work without pain treatments were impairments substantially limiting major life activities. In the court’s view, the fact that Smothers had sought numerous, regular treatments for pain and had underwent multiple surgeries to correct his degenerative disc condition was strong evidence that Smothers’ conditions substantially affected his major life activities. All of the corrective procedures Smothers had undergone failed to eliminate his pain or abate his sleeping problems. Therefore, the court held that Smothers had sufficiently demonstrated an “actual disability” under the expansive definition in the amended ADA. Furthermore, the fact that Smothers’ supervisors and managers had previously complained about his time away from work for pain treatments and had engaged in a one-sided investigation of the events surrounding the safety violation, sufficed for the reasonable inference of pretext necessary to establish an actionable claim for wrongful discharge under the ADA. As such, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal and permitted Smothers to proceed on his ADA and FMLA claims at the trial level.
What Employers Need to Know:
In both cases, the federal appellate courts acknowledged that the district courts’ decisions in favor of the employers were based on out-of-date interpretations of the ADA that were not consistent with the new amendments and therefore improperly restricted the ADA’s definition of “disability.” Both courts made clear that “disability” under the ADA can mean virtually any kind of physical or mental impairment if that condition substantially affects a major life activity, regardless of whether the condition is the result of an injury, expected to last only a few months, or impairs an activity outside of work, such as sleeping.
The takeaway for employers and their human resources departments going forward should be, first and foremost, that discharges should be based solely on an individual’s ability to perform the requirements of his or her job. If an employee is unable to keep regular attendance or perform fundamental aspects of his or her position, employers should be cautious and ask whether the employee has given notice to the employer of any physical or mental condition that could be the cause of such performance inadequacies. If so, employers should then consider whether the employee has requested accommodations for addressing these inadequacies that are reasonable and would enable the employee to resume the standard of performance expected. In those instances, the ADA expects employers to grant such reasonable requests for accommodations so that discriminatory treatment of those suffering from disabilities is avoided. However, the ADA does not require creation of a new position, “unreasonable” accommodations, or the retention of employees who cannot still perform the essential functions of their position even after a reasonable accommodation has been made.
If you have any questions regarding the cases discussed above; or the ADA or any question with respect to employment practices liability, please contact a member of our Employment Practices Liability Group.
