Indiana Supreme Court Holding Supports Limiting Premises Liability of Churches

by Katherine Haire, Esq.

The Indiana Supreme Court recently considered, for the first time, the duty of care that nonprofit religious organizations owe to invitees on their premises.  In Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Gerard A. Kirsch, No. 245-CT-378 (Ind. 2025), a case handled by Reminger Co., L.P.A., the Court held that “a church has limited premises liability” for injuries that occur on “a whole parcel of land . . . so long as the parcel is owned, operated, or controlled by the nonprofit religious organization and used primarily for worship services.”

This case originated when Gerard Kirsch, a Board member of Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, fell from a ladder and sustained a laceration while he was performing volunteer work on the Church’s premises.  Specifically, Kirsch had offered to take the lead on a construction project that consisted of building a small barn on an area of the Church’s property adjacent to the parking lot; the purpose of the barn was to provide a shelter for the Church-owned van.

The Church moved for summary judgment based on Indiana Code § 34-31-7-2, which provides for a limited duty of care for churches in certain circumstances.  Specifically, it provides:

Except as provided in section 3 of this chapter, a nonprofit religious organization has only the following duties concerning persons who enter premises owned, operated, or controlled by the nonprofit religious organization and used primarily for worship services:

1. 1. If a person enters the premises with the actual or implied permission of the nonprofit religious organization, the nonprofit religious organization has a duty to:
      1. warn the person of a hidden danger on the premises if a representative of the nonprofit religious organization has actual knowledge of the hidden danger; and
      2.  refrain from intentionally harming the person.
   2. If a person enters the premises without the actual or implied permission of the nonprofit religious organization, the nonprofit religious organization has the duty to refrain from intentionally harming the person.

The Church tendered an affidavit stipulating that it owned the premises where the injury occurred; that the primary purpose of the church’s property is for patrons to attend worship services; that it lacked knowledge of a hidden danger on the premises; and that it did not intentionally harm Kirsch.  However, the trial court found that the limited statutory duty did not apply because Kirsch fell on a portion of the Church’s grounds that was not specifically “used primarily for worship services,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer in order to resolve the scope of the term “premises” as used in the Statute.  In reversing the two lower courts, the Supreme Court noted that whether the Statute applies is contingent upon “how a church uses its premises” but declined to find that the Statute should govern the duty of care owed for injuries occurring only on discrete subparts of the property parcel.  The Supreme Court illustrated its holding with an analogy to a 64-square chessboard:

We look to the entire board to assess whether the opponents are playing chess.  That some squares do not contain chess pieces during the game does not mean the board is used “primarily” for a non-chess purpose.  So, too, with church-owned premises.  The legal question is whether the premises are being used “primarily” for worship services.  We do not answer that question with reference to only each discrete “square” of land.  We consider, instead, all “squares” in the aggregate.

Thus, a church-owned parcel must be considered as a whole – the entirety of the parcel is either used primarily for worship services or it is not. 

The Court distinguished situations in which a church-owned property might be used primarily for non-worship purposes, such as a church-owned hospital or school.  In those circumstances, the limited duty of care afforded by the Statute would not insulate the church from liability.  However, where the overall purpose of the church premises is for worship services, a church is entitled to the more favorable duty of care regardless of whether an invitee sustains injury inside the church sanctuary or on the swing-set in the church’s yard.

Accordingly, this Supreme Court decision should be a valuable tool for pursuing early dispositive motions in premises liability cases against Indiana nonprofit religious organizations.  In light of this holding, it would be a prudent strategy at the outset of this type of case to investigate (i) that the church owns the premises; (ii) that the primary function of the premises overall is for attending worship services; (iii) that there is no actual knowledge of a hidden danger on the premises; and (iv) that the church did not intentionally cause harm.  An affidavit establishing these elements can support a strong dispositive motion early in the litigation.

If you have any questions regarding this decision or any aspects of church liability laws, please contact an attorney from Reminger’s General Liability Practice Group.